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1 Introduction
Demand growth is usually understood as facilitating collusion, by reducing the short-
term gains of deviating relatively to the costs of future retaliation (Ivaldi et al., 2007).
However, demand growth may attract new firms to the market, which hinders collusion.
Vasconcelos (2008) is innovative in studying this trade-off in a model where demand
growth induces the entry of a new firm. Comparing the sustainability of collusion before
and after the entry, he concludes that collusion is more difficult to sustain before the
entry (i.e., when there are less firms in the market). The rationale for this result lies
in the possibility that incumbents have of delaying entry by disrupting the collusive
agreement.
In dynamic models of collusion, the standard continuation strategies after a deviation
are: grim trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971) and stick-and-carrot strategies (Abreu,
1986). Vasconcelos (2008) considers that, after a deviation, firms revert to the non-
cooperative equilibrium forever (i.e., he assumes grim trigger strategies). We intend to
study whether his conclusions would remain valid with stick-and-carrot strategies. In
particular, we consider that, folowing a deviation: there is a single period of punishment,
and the collusive agreement is recovered thereupon. This punishment is more severe than
that considered by Vasconcelos (2008), since it implies a zero continuation value after a
deviation (optimal penal code).
Another direction in which we complement the results of Vasconcelos (2008) concerns
the reaction of the incumbents to entry. Vasconcelos (2008) assumes that the incumbent
firms immediately accommodate the entrant in a more inclusive agreement.1 However,
as explained by Harrington (1989), Friedman and Thisse (1994) and Vasconcelos (2004),
this is just one of the possible cartel reactions to the entry of a new firm. Thus, we
analyze three alternative scenarios: (i) the collusive agreement is discontinued when entry
occurs; (ii) the entry is treated as a deviation from the collusive agreement, triggering
the punishment strategy; (iii) the entrant is gradually accommodated in the collusive
agreement (Friedman and Thisse, 1994).
The structure of our model is the same as in Vasconcelos (2008). We consider a
market with two incumbent firms and one potential entrant that compete a` la Cournot
in an infinitely repeated game. Market demand is linear and grows at a constant rate.
1Vasconcelos (2008) also studies the sustainability of partial collusion. More precisely, he considers
the possibility of the incumbents not including the entrant, behaving as a Stackelberg leader. He finds,
however, that such an agreement is not sustainable.
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Production costs are null. To become active, the potential entrant must support an
entry cost. When choosing its entry period, the entrant faces the following trade-off: on
the one hand, it wants to enter as soon as possible to produce and make profits; on the
other hand, postponing entry decreases (the discounted value of) the entry cost. Entry
occurs when the present value of the entrant’s profits is maximum.
At the beginning of the game, the incumbent firms agree to produce quantities that
maximize their joint profit in each period. Unilateral deviations trigger one period of
punishment, after which the collusive agreement is restored. The punishment is as harsh
as possible, inducing a zero continuation value after a deviation. As firms have positive
profits when collusion is restored, they must make losses in the punishment period. For
losses to be feasible (recall that there are no production costs), we assume that firms
may incur in some form of observable dissipative costs (such as unproductive advertising
or solidarity actions).2
We start by following Vasconcelos (2008) in assuming that the incumbents accommo-
date the entrant in their collusive agreement. In contrast with Vasconcelos (2008), we
conclude that collusion is more difficult to sustain after entry than before entry. The
result of Vasconcelos (2008) does not hold with stick-and-carrot punishment strategies,
because a deviation before the entry ceases to be an effective way of delaying entry and
enjoying additional pre-entry profits. A deviation can delay entry by one period, as the
entrant would never enter in the punishment period. However, since the continuation
value after the deviation is zero, the punishment absorbs all future profits (which include
the gains from delaying entry).
The idea that firms benefit from establishing collusive agreements is widely accepted.
Interestingly, we conclude that, in growing markets, the incumbent firms may prefer
competition to collusion. Two conditions are necessary for this finding: (i) entry occurs
later under competition (because the expected profits of the entrant are lower); and
(ii) individual profits are greater under competition with two firms than under collusion
with three firms. This implies that, under competition, the incumbents enjoy a longer
pre-entry period, in which, although competing, they obtain higher profits than if they
were colluding but entry had already occurred.
We compare our base case of immediate accommodation with three alternative reac-
2Costs of this kind were considered, in different contexts, by Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bag-
well and Ramey (1994), Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997), Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) and
Linnemer (2002).
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tions to entry: cartel breakdown, predation and gradual accommodation. In the scenario
of cartel breakdown, the collusive agreement is discontinued when entry occurs. As a
result, entry occurs later than in the case of immediate accommodation. We find that,
for this reason, the incumbents may prefer to break the cartel than to accommodate
entry. The collusive agreement is easier to sustain in this case, mainly because it only
involves two firms.
Alternatively, the cartel may respond to entry by implementing the following preda-
tory strategy: if entry occurs, incumbent firms start a punishment process (one period
of punishment followed by return to collusion), as if one of them had deviated from the
collusive agreement. As a result, if a new firm entered the market, its continuation value
would be null. Since it would not be profitable to support the entry cost, the severity of
this threat allows incumbents to effectively deter entry. This is the best scenario for the
incumbents. Of course, this outcome requires that the incumbents are able to credibly
commit to this extreme form of punishment.
Finally, we analyze the sustainability of a collusive agreement that gradually accom-
modates the entrant, as proposed by Friedman and Thisse (1994). More precisely, we
consider that: in the first period of activity, the entrant receives the non-cooperative
profit; in the second period, it receives the mean between the non-cooperative profit and
the collusive profit (one third of the monopoly profit); from the third period onwards,
the entrant is fully integrated into the collusive agreement and receives one third of the
monopoly profit. When compared to immediate accommodation, gradual accommoda-
tion is preferred by the incumbents because: (i) each incumbent receives a greater share
of the monopoly profit during the accommodation periods; and (ii) entry is delayed.
For the same reasons, the entrant obviously prefers immediate accommodation. As a
result, the entrant has more incentive to disrupt the collusive agreement than incum-
bents. This unbalance implies that collusion sustainability is lower than with immediate
accommodation.
In terms of social welfare, collusion is always detrimental relatively to competition.
Naturally, it is less so if it is discontinued following entry. The remaining collusive
scenarios are equivalent in terms of output and prices, as firms produce the monopoly
output in every period. Still, predation is slightly preferred to accommodation because
the entry cost is not supported. For the same reason, gradual accommodation is socially
preferred to immediate accommodation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the key as-
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sumptions of the model and derives the optimal entry period. Section 3 describes the
collusive agreement in the case of immediate accommodation of the entrant. Section 4
analyzes alternative reactions to entry that may delay or even deter the entry of a new
firm. Section 5 summarizes the main results of the paper. The Appendix contains the
proofs of most propositions and lemmas.
2 Model
Consider an industry with two incumbents (firms 1 and 2) and a potential entrant (firm 3)
that sell homogeneous products and compete by simultaneously choosing the quantities
to produce, in an infinitely repeated setting. Production costs are null. Market demand
in period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} is given by:
Qt = (1− pt)µt, (1)
where µ > 1 is the demand growth rate and pt is the price in period t. We assume “free
disposal”. Therefore, the inverse demand function is:
pt =
{
1−Qtµ−t if Qt ≤ µt
0 if Qt > µ
t.
(2)
To enter the market, firm 3 must support a setup cost, K > 0. Before the entry of firm
3, the timing of each period’s stage game is the following:
1st: Firm 3 decides whether or not to enter the market in the current period.
2nd: Active firms simultaneously choose the quantities to produce.
After the entry of firm 3, the single-period game is reduced to the second stage.
The objective of each firm is to maximize the discounted sum of its profits,
∑+∞
t=0 δ
tpit,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the common discount factor. For this sum to be finite, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Demand does not grow too fast: µδ < 1.
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In period t, the profit function of each firm is given by:
pit(qt) =
(
1− qtµ−t − q−i,tµ−t
)
qt,
where q−i,t is the sum of the quantities produced by its competitors in period t. Profit-
maximization yields the following best-reply function:
qt(q−i,t) =
1
2
µt − q−i,t
2
. (3)
When there are n ∈ {2, 3} firms engaging in Cournot competition, the output and profit
of each firm, in period t, are given by:
qcnt =
1
1 + n
µt and picnt =
1
(1 + n)2
µt. (4)
If firms collude and maximize their joint profit, the individual output and profit are:
qmnt =
1
2n
µt and pimnt =
1
4n
µt. (5)
If firm 3 enters the market in period T and obtains a profit pit = Πµ
t in all the following
periods, t ≥ T , the present value of its profits is:
V3(T ) =
+∞∑
t=T
δtΠµt − δTK = (µδ)
T
1− µδΠ− δ
TK.
When deciding when to enter the market, firm 3 faces a trade-off: on the one hand, an
earlier entry means start receiving profits sooner; on the other hand, by delaying entry,
firm 3 decreases the (discounted) entry cost. Entry occurs when V3(T ) is maximal.
Lemma 1. If firm 3 expects its profits in each period to be given by pit = Πµ
t, it enters
the market at:
T =
{
int(τ) if V3(int(τ)) ≥ V3(int(τ) + 1)
int(τ) + 1 if V3(int(τ)) < V3(int(τ) + 1),
where int(τ) denotes the integer part of τ , the real number that maximizes V3(·):
τ =
1
ln(µ)
ln
[
(1− µδ)ln(δ)K
ln(µδ)Π
]
. (6)
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Proof. See Appendix.
To calculate the optimal entry period for the case in which firm 3 expects to collude
with the incumbents, Tm, simply replace Π = 1
12
in (6) and in the expression for V3(T ).
Similarly, to calculate the optimal entry period for the scenario in which firm 3 expects
to engage in Cournot competition, T c, replace Π = 1
16
.
The following assumption guarantees that Tm ≥ 1, which means that the incumbents
are alone in the market at t = 0 (even if the entrant expects to collude after entry).3
Assumption 2. The entry cost is not too small: K > 1
12(1−δ) .
3 Collusion with entry accommodation
In this section, we consider a perfect collusive agreement with an optimal penal code,
assuming that the entrant is included in the cartel after entering the market. Under this
agreement, firms maximize their joint profits and inflict the severest possible punishment
on deviators.
3.1 Collusive agreement with an optimal penal code
At the beginning of period t = 0, firms 1 and 2 make a collusive agreement (which
extends to firm 3 when it enters the market) establishing that, in each period:
• Firms produce the quantities that maximize the industry profit, if the agreement
was honored in the previous period.
• Firms carry out a stick-and-carrot punishment, if the agreement was violated in
the previous period.
The stick-and-carrot punishment strategy (Abreu, 1986) consists in inflicting a single
period of losses and reverting to the collusive agreement afterwards. If any of the firms
avoids the single-period loss, the punishment is restarted.
3It is straightforward to check that V3(1) > V3(0) if and only if K >
Π
1−δ . Since pi
m3
t =
1
12µ
t, replace
Π = 112 to obtain K >
1
12(1−δ) .
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Incentives for complying with the collusive agreement naturally depend on the strength
of the punishment. The harshest possible punishment gives zero continuation value (to
all firms) after a deviation.4 It requires that firms have strictly negative profits in the
punishment period.
For losses to be feasible (recall that production costs are null), we assume that firms
can make observable unproductive expenditures, such as dissipative advertising. This
possibility has been considered before by Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bagwell and
Ramey (1994), Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997), Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001)
and Linnemer (2002), among others.
We focus on the following penal code, which gives zero continuation value to a devi-
ator. If a deviation occurs in period t, and there are n ∈ {2, 3} active firms:
• In period t+1, firms produce quantities that completely satiate the market (imply-
ing that the price is zero, even if one of the firms deviates and produces nothing):
qpnt+1 =
1
n− 1µ
t+1,
and spend an amount in dissipative advertising which implies that the continuation
value is null (this amount is calculated in the Appendix).
• If no firm deviates in the punishment period, the collusive agreement is reinstated
in period t+2. Otherwise, the punishment is restarted and the return to collusion
is delayed by one period.
Given the severity of this punishment, firms might deviate in the punishment phase.
Firms adhere to the punishment if and only if the following incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied:
V pnt+1 ≥ pidpnt+1 + δV pnt+2 , ∀t ≥ 0, (7)
where pidpnt+1 is the maximum profit that a firm can earn by deviating in the punishment
period, while the remainder n − 1 firms play the punishment strategy; and V pnt+1 is the
discounted value of profits along the punishment path (i.e., if firms cooperate in the
punishment at t+ 1 and revert to collusion at t+ 2).
4Note that firms can always guarantee a payoff of zero by producing zero in every period.
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By construction, the optimal penal code gives zero continuation value after a deviation
(V pnt+1 = V
pn
t+2 = 0). This allows us to write the ICC (7) as:
pidpnt+1 ≤ 0 , ∀t ≥ 0.
This condition is satisfied because, as mentioned before, if n − 1 firms adhere to the
punishment in period t + 1, they produce an output which ensures that the resulting
price is zero, regardless of the output of the deviator. Therefore, it is impossible for a
deviatior to attain a strictly positive profit. The best it can do is have a null (instead of
negative) profit by not spending on dissipative advertising.
We will now study whether firms, knowing that the penal code is credible, have
incentives to deviate from the collusive agreement.
3.2 Sustainability of collusion
The collusive agreement is sustainable if firms do not have incentives to deviate neither
before nor after the entry of firm 3, which occurs at Tm.
Collusion is sustainable after entry if and only if the following incentive compatibility
constraint holds for all t ≥ Tm:
+∞∑
s=t
δs−tpim3s ≥ pid3t ,
where pid3t is the deviation profit. The continuation value after the deviation is omitted
from the ICC because, under the optimal penal code, it is null.
Proposition 1. Collusion is sustainable after entry if and only if: µδ ≥ 1
4
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Before the entry of firm 3, the collusive agreement is sustainable if and only if the
following incentive compatibility constraint holds for all t ≤ Tm − 1:
Tm−1∑
s=t
δs−tpim2s +
+∞∑
s=Tm
δs−tpim3s ≥ pid2t , (8)
9
where pid2t is the deviation profit before the entry (the continuation value after a deviation
is, again, omitted because it is null).
Lemma 2. Let µδ ≥ 1
9
. If the ICC (8) is satisfied in the period that immediately preceeds
entry, t = Tm − 1, it is satisfied in all previous periods, t ∈ {0, 1, ..., Tm − 2}.
Proof. See Appendix.
Considering the ICC at t = Tm − 1, we obtain the critical discount factor above which
collusion is sustainable before the entry of firm 3.
Proposition 2. Collusion is sustainable before entry if and only if: µδ ≥ 3
19
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we conclude that collusion is less sustainable after entry
than before. The reason is related to the standard result that collusion is less sustainable
if the number of firms is higher (Ivaldi et al., 2003).
Our conclusion is the opposite of the one obtained by Vasconcelos (2008) and by
Branda˜o et al. (2012), who have assumed that if one firm deviates from the collusive
agrement, firms revert to Cournot competition forever (grim trigger strategies). In their
models, incumbents have an additional incentive to deviate before the entry of firm 3,
because a deviation effectively delays its entry. The delay results from the reduction of
the profits that firm 3 expects to receive, which decrease from the perfect collusion level
to the Cournot competition level. In the meantime, the incumbents benefit because
Cournot competition between the two is more profitable than perfect collusion with
three firms. In our model, firms use stick-and-carrot strategies. Thus, the best that
incumbents can do is to delay entry by one single period (by deviating in the period that
immediately preceeds the entry of firm 3, i.e., at Tm − 1). However, since the optimal
penal code absorbs all the continuation value, delaying entry is irrelevant. Firms deviate
if and only if the single-period deviation profit exceeds the value of colluding forever.
Corollary 1. Collusion is sustainable (before and after entry) if and only if: µδ ≥ 1
4
.
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We have concluded that, if µδ ≥ 1
4
, the collusive agreement is sustainable and, therefore,
entry occurs at Tm.
In the next section, we consider alternative reactions of the cartel to entry and compare
them with this benchmark case. We also analyze the case in which the incumbents do
not establish any collusive agreement.
4 Can the incumbents profitably delay entry?
In this section, we study four alternative scenarios:
(i) no collusion;
(ii) collusion before entry and competition after entry;
(iii) collusion before entry and punishment if and when entry occurs;
(iv) gradual accommodation of the entrant in the collusive agreement.
The motivation for studying the case in which there is no collusion is obvious, as we
are interested in understanding the implications of collusion. It is also the scenario that
appears if the discount factor is not sufficiently high for collusion to be sustainable.
The remaining alternative scenarios correspond to relevant variations regarding the re-
action of the incumbents to the entry of firm 3, previously considered and compared by
Harrington (1989) and Friedman and Thisse (1994).5
4.1 No collusion
If there is no collusion, the present value of the profits of each incumbent is:
V ci =
T c−1∑
s=0
δspic2s +
+∞∑
s=T c
δspic3s , (9)
where T c is the period at which firm 3 enters the market. The next Proposition shows
that collusion is not always beneficial to the incumbents.
5See also the discussion by Harrington (1991).
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Proposition 3. The incumbents are better off under competition than under collusion
with entry accommodation if and only if: 2− 6(µδ)Tm + 7(µδ)T c < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The parameter values for which the incumbents prefer competition to collusion with
accommodation of the entrant are represented in Figure 1. In the painted area, the
collusive agreement with entry accommodation would be sustainable, since µδ ∈ (1
4
, 1
)
,
but the incumbents prefer the competitive scenario.
1/4 1/2 3/4 1
1
4/3
δ
µ
µδ<1/4
µδ>1
Violates
Assumption 2
Figure 1: Competition versus entry accommodation (for K = 13 ).
It may seem counterintuitive that the incumbent firms prefer not to collude. Notice,
however, that: (i) a collusive agreement with accommodation of the entrant induces an
earlier entry (at Tm rather than at T c); and (ii) incumbents benefit from higher profits
when there is competition between two firms than when there is collusion involving three
firms. Of course, the entrant surely prefers the collusive scenario.
4.2 Discontinuance of collusion
Suppose now that the collusive agreement is terminated when firm 3 enters the market.
More precisely, the collusive agreement established by the incumbents is the following:
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• Before the entry of firm 3, maximize joint profit, producing qm2t = 14µt, if the
agreement was honored in the previous period.
• If there is a defection in period t, engage in one period of punishment, producing
qp2t+1 = µ
t+1 and spending an amount in dissipative advertising that makes the
continuation value null (optimal penal code).6
• After the entry of firm 3, compete in quantities.
In this scenario, the optimal entry period is the same as when there is no collusion.
The collusive agreement is obviously sustainable after entry, since firms are playing
their best-response to the rivals’ actions. Before the entry of firm 3, the incumbents
abide by the collusive agreement if and only if:
T c−1∑
s=t
δs−tpim2s +
+∞∑
s=T c
δs−tpic3s ≥ pid2t , ∀t < T c. (10)
Lemma 3. Let µδ ≥ 1
9
. If the ICC (10) is satisfied in the period that immediately
preceeds entry, t = T c − 1, it is satisfied in all previous periods, t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T c − 2}.
Proof. Follow exactly the steps of the proof of Lemma 2.
Substituting t = T c − 1 and the expressions for profits in the ICC (10), we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 4. The collusive agreement with cartel breakdown following entry is sus-
tainable if and only if: µδ ≥ 1
5
.
Proof. See Appendix.
To investigate whether or not the incumbents prefer discontinuance of collusion to im-
mediate accommodation, we compare the present value of profits in the two scenarios.
6The amount of disspative advertising is given by the same expression as in the base-case collusive
agreement (calculated in the Appendix), except that T c must be considered instead of Tm.
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Proposition 5. The incumbents are better off discontinuing the collusive agreement
when entry occurs than accommodating the entrant if and only if: (µδ)T
c−Tm < 2
3
.
Proof. See Appendix.
The parameter values for which the incumbents prefer discontinuance of collusion to
accommodation of the entrant are represented in Figure 2. In the painted area, the
incumbents prefer reversion to competition to entry accommodation (collusion is sus-
tainable in both scenarios).
1/4 1/2 3/4 1
1
4/3
δ
µ
µδ<1/4
µδ>1
Violates
Assumption 2
Figure 2: Discontinuance of collusion versus entry accommodation (for K = 13 ).
4.3 Predation
Consider now that the incumbents are able to commit to the following agreement:
• Produce quantities that maximize the industry profit, qm2t = 14µt, if the agreement
was honored in the previous period, and if firm 3 did not enter the market.
• If one of the incumbents deviates in period t, engage in punishment in period
t+ 1, producing qp2t+1 = µ
t and spending an amount in dissipative advertising that
absorbs all the continuation value.7
7This amount can be calculated using the same method as in the case of collusion with entry accom-
modation.
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• If firm 3 enters in period t, engage in punishment immediately: produce qp3t = µt
and make an expenditure in dissipative advertising that is enough for the contin-
uation value to be null.
Since the continuation value after the entry is zero, entering the market is not profitable
(due to the entry cost, K > 0). Therefore, in this scenario, the incumbents effectively
deter the entry of firm 3.
Proposition 6. The collusive agreement with entry deterrence is sustainable if and only
if: µδ ≥ 1
9
.
Proof. See Appendix.
If feasible, this is the best scenario for the incumbents. Each of them receives half of
the monopoly profit in all periods. On the other hand, this is the worst scenario for
consumers and for the entrant.
Remark 1. The incumbents are always better off in this scenario (in which entry is
deterred) that in the scenario of collusion with entry accommodation.
4.4 Gradual accommodation
Following Friedman and Thisse (1994), we now assume that the accommodation of the
entrant in the collusive agreement is not immediate. Firms still maximize the industry
profit (before and after the entry), but there is an adjustment phase during which the
entrant receives a smaller share of the industry profit than the incumbents.
We consider a version of the gradual accommodation process proposed by Friedman
and Thisse (1994) that is simplified in two aspects: (i) in the first period of activity, the
entrant receives exactly (instead of slightly more than) the non-cooperative profit; and
(ii) the adjustment takes two (instead of n) periods. These assumptions simplify the
analysis without qualitatively affecting the results.
In this scenario, the profit of firm 3 if it enters the market in period T is equal to:
• The Cournot competition profit (with 3 firms), in the entry period: pigT = 116µT .
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• The arithmetic mean between the Cournot competition profit and the collusive
profit, in the period that follows the entry: pigT+1 =
7
96
µT+1.
• The collusive profit, from period T + 2 onwards: pigt = 112µt, ∀t ≥ T + 2.
The discounted value of the entrant’s profits is, therefore:
V g3 (T ) =
1
16
(µδ)T +
7
96
(µδ)T+1 +
(µδ)T+2
12(1− µδ) − δ
TK.
Firm 3 enters the market when V g3 (T ) is maximum, that is, in period:
T g =
{
int(τ g) if V g3 (int(τ
g)) ≥ V g3 (int(τ g) + 1)
int(τ g) + 1 if V g3 (int(τ
g)) < V g3 (int(τ
g) + 1),
where:
τ g =
1
ln(µ)
ln
[
96(1− µδ)ln(δ)K
ln(µδ) [6 + µδ + (µδ)2]
]
.
It is straightforward that the incumbents are able to delay the entry of firm 3 by accom-
modating its entry gradually instead of immediately: Tm ≤ T g ≤ T c.
The industry profit is equal to the monopoly profit in every period. During the
accommodation periods (T g and T g + 1), each incumbent receives half of the difference
between the monopoly profit and the entrant’s profit:
pigT g =
3
32
µT
g
and pigT g+1 =
17
192
µT
g+1.
As in the previous sections, we consider that if one firm deviates from the collusive
agreement, firms engage in one period of punishment and then return to collusion. In
the punishment period, firms must support dissipative advertising expenses that exactly
offset their future profits (the continuation value after a deviation is zero).
To study the sustainability of collusion with gradual accommodation, start by noticing
that, after the accommodation phase, there is no difference between this scenario and
the benchmark case. Therefore, from Proposition 1, firms honor the collusive agreement
at any t ≥ T g + 2 if and only if µδ ≥ 1
4
. However, this condition is not sufficient for the
entrant to comply with the collusive agreement during the accommodation process.
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Proposition 7. The incentives for the entrant to deviate from the collusive agreement
are the strongest at the entry period, T g. The entrant does not deviate if and only if
µδ ≥
√
7753−83
16
≈ 0.316.
Proof. See Appendix.
Contrarily to the entrant, the incumbents have more incentives to deviate after the
accommodation phase.
Proposition 8. The incentives for the incumbents to deviate from the collusive agree-
ment are stronger after the accommodation phase (i.e., in periods t ≥ T g + 2) than
during the accommodation phase. The incumbents do not deviate after entry if and only
if µδ ≥ 1
4
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we need to analyze the incentives for incumbents to deviate before entry. The
ICC for periods t < T g can be written as:
1
8
T g−1∑
s=t
(µδ)s +
3
32
(µδ)T
g
+
17
192
(µδ)T
g+1 +
1
12
+∞∑
s=T g+2
(µδ)s ≥ 9
64
(µδ)t. (11)
Lemma 4. Let µδ ≥ 1
9
. If the ICC (11) is satisfied in the period that immediately
preceeds entry, t = T g − 1, it is satisfied in all previous periods, t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T g − 2}.
Proof. Follow exactly the steps of the proof of Lemma 2.
Replacing t = T g − 1 in the incentive constraint (11), we obtain the critical discount
factor for the sustainability of collusion before entry.
Proposition 9. Collusion is sustainable before entry if and only if µδ ≥ 0.144.
Proof. See Appendix.
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The incentive compatibility constraint that binds is the one that guarantees that the
entrant does not deviate in the entry period.
Corollary 2. The collusive agreement with gradual accommodation is sustainable if and
only if: µδ ≥
√
7753−83
16
≈ 0.316.
It is straightforward that incumbents prefer to gradually accommodate the entrant, in-
stead of treating it immediately as a full partner. There are two reasons for this: (i)
gradual accommodation delays entry; and (ii) the share of incumbents in the industry
profit is greater during the accommodation process. For the same reasons, the entrant
is better off with immediate accommodation.
4.5 Welfare analysis
In this Section, we compare the different cartel reactions to entry in terms of the surplus
of incumbents, entrant and consumers.
4.5.1 Incumbents surplus
Predation is clearly the scenario that gives the highest payoff to incumbents (since they
receive half of the monopoly profit in every period).
It is also clear that the incumbents are better off by accommodating entry gradually
rather than instantaneously (V gi > V
a
i ), because entry is delayed and because they enjoy
a greater profit during the acommodation process.
The comparison between the scenarios of competition and discontinuance of collusion
is also immediate (V dci > V
c
i ), because: entry occurs at the same period; post-entry
profits are the same; and pre-entry profits are lower under competition.
Remark 2. The preferences of the incumbents regarding the different scenarios always
satisfy the following partial order:
V ai < V
g
i < V
p
i and V
c
i < V
dc
i < V
p
i .
18
All the preference orderings that are compatible with the partial ordering in Remark 2
occur for some values of the parameters.
4.5.2 Entrant surplus
Obviously, the worst scenario for the potential entrant is the one in which the incumbents
adopt a predatory behavior. In that case, entry does not even occur (V pe = 0).
It is irrelevant for the entrant whether the incumbents compete from the beginning or
discontinue collusion when entry occurs (V ce = V
dc
e ). Entry occurs at the same moment
and the entrant’s flow of profits is the same.
To verify that gradual accommodation is preferred to competition, suppose that entry
under gradual accommodation occurred at the period in which it would be optimal
to enter period under competition, T c. Even in that case, gradual accommodation
would be preferred to competition, because the discounted entry cost would be the same
while the flow of profits would be greater under gradual accommodation. Having the
possibility of entering at T g instead of T c only increases the value of the scenario of
gradual accommodation. Therefore, V ge > V
c
e .
Following a similar reasoning, we conclude that the entrant is better off if it is imme-
diately accommodated in the collusive agreement rather than gradually (V ae > V
g
e ).
Remark 3. The preferences of the entrant regarding the different scenarios always satisfy
the following complete order:
V pe < V
c
e = V
dc
e < V
g
e < V
a
e .
4.5.3 Consumer surplus
We measure consumer welfare as the discounted sum of each period’s consumer surplus:
CS =
+∞∑
t=0
δt
Qt (1− pt)
2
=
1
2
+∞∑
t=0
(µδ)t (1− pt)2 .
Notice that consumers are not directly affected by the timing of entry nor by the way
how incumbents react to entry. The only thing that interests consumers is total output
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and the resulting market price.
The non-cooperative scenario is the best for consumers, because the output is the
highest in all periods. For the same reason, consumers prefer discontinuance of collusion
to entry accommodation (CSa < CSdc), as there is competition from entry onwards.
Predation and (instanteneous or gradual) accommodation are equivalent for consumers,
because the output is at the monopoly level in all periods (CSp = CSa = CSg).
The following remark summarizes these observations.
Corollary 3. The preferences of consumers regarding the different scenarios always sat-
isfy the following complete order:
CSp = CSg = CSa < CSdc < CSc.
4.5.4 Social welfare
As production costs are null, social welfare is increasing in total output. In addition,
ceteris paribus, the later is the entry of firm 3 (i.e., the lower is the discounted value of
the entry cost), the higher is social welfare.
It is clear that social welfare is higher if there is no collusion than if there is collusion
with immediate accommodation, because the output is higher (in every period) and the
entry occurs later. Likewise, discontinuance of collusion is socially better than entry
accommodation, but worse than competition (W a < W dc < W c).
The output is the same under immediate accommodation, gradual accommodation
and predation. However, social welfare is higher when accommodation is gradual than
when it is immediate, because the entry cost is supported later, and it is even higher
under predation, because the entry cost is not even supported (W a < W g < W p).
Remark 4. In terms of social welfare, the different scenarios always satisfy the following
partial order:
W a < W dc < W c and W a < W g < W p.
The comparison between discontinuance of collusion and predation is not straightfor-
ward. On the one hand, total output is greater when collusion is discontinued. On the
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other hand, the entry cost is not supported under predation. We find that the addi-
tional output more than compensates the entry cost, which means that discontinuance
of collusion is preferable to predation.
Proposition 10. Social welfare is higher if incumbents discontinue collusion when entry
occurs than if they adopt a predatory behavior: W p < W dc.
Proof. See Appendix.
Together with Remark 4, Proposition 10 allows us to complete the social welfare ordering
of the different scenarios.
Corollary 4. In terms of social welfare, the different scenarios always satisfy the fol-
lowing complete order:
W a < W g < W p < W dc < W c.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the sustainability of collusion in markets where the demand
growth may attract the entry of a new firm. In a similar model, Vasconcelos (2008)
assumed that, after a deviation from the collusive agreement, firms revert to the Nash
equilibrium forever (trigger strategies). However, it is well known that, under quantity
competition, firms can improve the sustainability of the collusive agreement by adopting
Abreu-type punishment strategies. Motivated by this idea, we modified the work of
Vasconcelos (2008) by characterizing a security level penal code (i.e. a punishment
strategy according to which all firms are driven down to a zero continuation value in
case a deviation occurs). More precisely, we assume that a deviation triggers a period of
severe losses, after which the collusive agreement is restored (stick-and-carrot strategies).
Following Vasconcelos (2008), we started by considering that the incumbents accom-
modate the entrant in a more inclusive agreement as soon as entry occurs. We found
that, in contrast with the conclusions of Vasconcelos (2008), collusion is more difficult
to sustain after entry than before. This finding conforms to the idea that: the higher is
the number of firms in the market, the less sustainable is collusion. The origin of the
difference between our result and that of Vasconcelos (2008) is in the ability of the incum-
bents to increase their profits by delaying entry (following a disruption of the collusive
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agreement). If firms use grim trigger strategies, the cartel breakdown effectively delays
entry. This benefits the incumbents because Cournot competition between the two is
more profitable than collusion among three firms. With optimal penal codes, breaking
the agreement leads to a punishment that absorbs all future profits. As a result, an entry
delay would be irrelevant.
One of our most surprising results is that incumbents may prefer to compete since the
beginning of the game rather than to make a collusive agreement that accommodates
the entrant. Once again, the explanation for this result lies in the possibility of delaying
entry and in the fact that Cournot competition with two firms is more profitable than
collusion with three firms.
We have also considered other reactions to entry, which may delay (or even prevent)
the entry of a new firm. In particular: (i) discontinuance of collusion; (ii) predation; and
(iii) gradual accommodation.
The best scenario for the incumbents is the one in which they are able to deter entry
by credibly threatening to regard entry as a deviation (i.e., predation). In addition, the
incumbents surely prefer to gradually accommodate the entrant than to have it as a full
partner immediately after entry. Depending on the model parameters, the incumbents
may be better off with discontinuance of collusion or with immediate accommodation.
On the one hand, entry occurs later if the collusive agreement is discontinued when
entry occurs; on the other hand, the incumbents profit more after the entry if they
accommodate the entrant. Unsurprisingly, the worst scenario for the entrant is the one
in which the incumbents adopt a predatory behaviour; while the best scenario is the one
in which the incumbents immediately include it in the collusive agreement.
Consumer surplus is the same under predation and under immediate or gradual ac-
commodation. The reason for this result is that, in all these scenarios, output and price
are at their monopoly levels. As products are homogeneous, entry is irrelevant for con-
sumers unless it impacts the output and price levels. Of course, consumers are better
off if firms compete in all periods. As there are no production costs, the social welfare
is also increasing in the output level. For this reason, competition is also the socially
preferred scenario, followed by discontinuance of collusion. The timing of entry must also
be taken into account, as it is socially beneficial to support the entry cost later and it is
even better to avoid it altogether. This is why entry accommodation is more damaging
to social welfare than predation.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let us start by dealing with t as a continuous variable and denote it by τ . The first-order
condition for the maximization of V3(τ) is:
Π
1− µδ (µδ)
τ ln(µδ)−Kδτ ln(δ) = 0 ⇔ τ = 1
ln(µ)
ln
[
(1− µδ)ln(δ)K
ln(µδ)Π
]
.
As time is discrete, the optimal entry period will be one of the two integers that are
closest to τ , depending on which of those yields the highest value for V3(t). 
Calculation of the amount of dissipative cost (At+1)
Here, we obtain the value of the dissipative cost, At+1, for the collusive agreement defined
in Section 3.1. This value must be such that the continuation value after a deviation is
zero.
Recall that the output of each firm in the punishment period is high enough for the
resulting market price to be null, even if there is a deviation. Therefore, as production
costs are null, the profit of each firm in the punishment period t+ 1 is pipt+1 = −At+1.
Keep in mind that the decision of firm 3 regarding its entry period only depends on
the flow of profits that it expects to obtain after the entry. If firm 3 expects to get one
third of the monopoly profit in all periods, entry occurs in period Tm. Firm 3 does not
care about the existence of a deviation in any period t ≤ Tm − 2, because the collusive
agreement would be restored at Tm. The entry decision is only affected if one incumbent
deviates at Tm − 1. In that case, the punishment takes place at Tm and firm 3 delays
its entry to Tm + 1.
Suppose that the deviation takes place at t ≤ Tm−3. The punishment will be carried
out at t + 1, there will be collusion with two firms from t + 2 until Tm − 1, entry will
take place at Tm, and there will be collusion with three firms from Tm onwards. In this
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case, for the continuation value to be null:
At+1 =
Tm−1∑
s=t+2
δs−(t+1)pim2s +
+∞∑
s=Tm
δs−(t+1)pim3s = δ
−(t+1)
[
Tm−1∑
s=t+2
(µδ)s
8
+
+∞∑
s=Tm
(µδ)s
12
]
=
µδ
[
3− (µδ)Tm−t−2]
24(1− µδ) µ
t+1.
If the deviation takes place at t = Tm − 2, entry will still take place at Tm, and there
will be collusion with three firms from t+ 2 onwards. Therefore:
At+1 =
+∞∑
s=t+2
δs−(t+1)pim3s =
µδ
12(1− µδ)µ
t+1.
If a firm deviates at t = Tm − 1, the punishment will be carried out in period Tm. In
that case, firm 3 postpones its entry to period Tm + 1 (in which firms will be, again,
colluding). After the punishment period, there will be collusion with three firms. Again,
the amount of dissipative advertising must be exactly that which absorbs the value of
collusion with three firms from t+ 2 onwards.
If a firm deviates after the entry, at t ≥ Tm, there will also be collusion with three
firms from t+ 2 onwards. Therefore, the same expression for At+1 applies.
We conclude that:
At+1 =

µδ[3−(µδ)Tm−t−2]
24(1−µδ) µ
t+1, if t ≤ Tm − 3
µδ
12(1−µδ)µ
t+1, if t ≥ Tm − 2.
Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting q−i,t = 13µ
t in (3), we obtain the deviation output, qd3t =
1
3
µt, which yields
pid3t =
1
9
µt. Substituting the expressions for profits in the ICC, we obtain:
1
12
δ−t
+∞∑
s=t
(µδ)s ≥ 1
9
µt ⇔ µδ ≥ 1
4
.

24
Proof of Lemma 2
Substituting q−i,t = 14µ
t in the best-reply function (3), we obtain the deviation quantity,
qd2t =
3
8
µt, and the corresponding profit, pid2t =
9
64
µt. Substituting the expressions for
profits in the ICC (8), we obtain:
1
8
Tm−1∑
s=t
(µδ)s +
1
12
+∞∑
s=Tm
(µδ)s ≥ 9
64
(µδ)t.
The ICC in period t = Tm − τ , with 1 ≤ τ ≤ Tm, is given by:
1
8
Tm−1∑
s=Tm−τ
(µδ)s +
1
12
+∞∑
s=Tm
(µδ)s ≥ 9
64
(µδ)T
m−τ . (12)
We want to show that if (12) is satisfied for τ = k, then it is also satisfied for τ = k+ 1.
Our hypothesis is, therefore, that:
1
8
Tm−1∑
s=Tm−k
(µδ)s +
1
12
+∞∑
s=Tm
(µδ)s − 9
64
(µδ)T
m−k ≥ 0. (13)
For τ = k + 1, the ICC (12) can be written as:
1
8
Tm−1∑
s=Tm−k−1
(µδ)s +
1
12
+∞∑
s=Tm
(µδ)s − 9
64
(µδ)T
m−k−1 ≥ 0. (14)
Subtracting the left-hand side of (13) from that of (14), we obtain:
1
8
(µδ)T
m−k−1 − 9
64
[
(µδ)T
m−k−1 − (µδ)Tm−k] = 9µδ − 1
64
(µδ)T
m−k−1.
This expression is positive, meaning that (13) implies (14), if and only if µδ ≥ 1
9
. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Collusion is sustainable at Tm − 1 (and, therefore, at all t < Tm) if and only if:
1
8
(µδ)Tm−1 +
1
12
+∞∑
s=Tm
(µδ)s ≥ 9
64
(µδ)Tm−1 ⇔ (µδ)
Tm
1− µδ ≥
3
16
(µδ)Tm−1 ⇔ µδ ≥ 3
19
.

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Proof of Proposition 3
The incumbents prefer no collusion to collusion with immediate accommodation if and
only if:
Tm−1∑
s=0
δs
(
pic2s − pim2s
)
+
T c−1∑
s=Tm
δs
(
pic2s − pim3s
)
+
+∞∑
s=T c
δs
(
pic3s − pim3s
) ≥ 0.
Manipulating this condition, we obtain:
− 1
72
Tm−1∑
s=0
(µδ)s +
1
36
T c−1∑
s=Tm
(µδ)s − 1
48
+∞∑
s=T c
(µδ)s ≥ 0 ⇔
− 2 [1− (µδ)Tm]+ 4 [(µδ)Tm − (µδ)T c]− 3(µδ)T c ≥ 0 ⇔
− 2 + 6(µδ)Tm − 7(µδ)T c ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Replacing the expressions for profits, we can write the ICC (10) as follows:
1
8
T c−1∑
s=t
(µδ)s +
1
16
+∞∑
s=T c
(µδ)s ≥ 9
64
(µδ)t. (15)
Lemma 3 allows us to consider t = T c − 1 to obtain the critical discount factor:
1
8
(µδ)T
c−1 +
1
16
+∞∑
s=T c
(µδ)s ≥ 9
64
(µδ)T
c−1 ⇔ (µδ)
T c
16(1− µδ) ≥
(µδ)T
c−1
64
⇔ µδ ≥ 1
5
.

Proof of Proposition 5
The present value of profits of an incumbent firm in the collusive agreement with imme-
diate accommodation of the entrant is:
V m =
Tm−1∑
t=0
δtpim2t +
+∞∑
t=Tm
δtpim3t ,
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while, in the case of reversion to competition, it is:
V rc =
T c−1∑
t=0
δtpim2t +
+∞∑
t=T c
δtpic3t .
Therefore, incumbents prefer reversion to competition relatively to accommodation if
and only if:
V m > V rc ⇔
T c−1∑
t=Tm
δt(pim2t − pim3t ) +
+∞∑
t=T c
δt(pic3t − pim3t ) > 0
⇔ 1
24
T c−1∑
t=Tm
(µδ)t − 1
48
+∞∑
t=T c
(µδ)t > 0 ⇔ (µδ)T c−Tm < 2
3
.

Proof of Proposition 6
Since the continuation value after a deviation is null, the incumbents are willing to
sustain the collusive agreement in period t ≥ 0 if:
+∞∑
s=t
δs−tpim2s ≥ pid2t ⇔
1
8
+∞∑
s=t
(µδ)s ≥ 9
64
(µδ)t ⇔ (µδ)
t
1− µδ ≥
9
8
(µδ)t ⇔ µδ ≥ 1
9
.

Proof of Proposition 7
(i) We start by analyzing the incentives for the entrant to abide by the collusive agree-
ment in period T g+1. As the price is equal to pT g+1 =
1
2
and the profit of each incumbent
is piT g+1 =
17
192
µT
g+1, we conclude that each incumbent produces 17
96
µT
g+1. Substituting
this in the best-reply function of the entrant, given in (3), we obtain the deviation output
of the entrant and the corresponding profit:
qdgT g+1 =
31
96
µT
g+1 and pidgT g+1 =
961
9216
µT
g+1.
Therefore, the entrant does not defect in period T g + 1 if the following ICC is satisfied:
7
96
µTg+1 +
+∞∑
s=Tg+2
δs−Tg−1
1
12
µs ≥ 961
9216
µTg+1 ⇔
1
12
µδ
1− µδ ≥
289
9216
⇔ µδ ≥ 289
1057
≈ 0.273.
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(ii) Now, we do the same for period T g. In this period, the entrant should receive
the Cournot competition profit, piT g =
1
16
µT
g
, but the price is equal to the monopoly
price, pT g =
1
2
. According to the agreement, the entrant should produce 1
8
µt, while the
incumbents jointly produce 3
8
µt. The best possible deviation by the entrant yields:
qd3Tg =
5
16
µTg and pid3Tg =
25
256
µTg .
As a result, the entrant abides by the collusive agreement if and only if:
1
16
µT
g
+ δ
7
96
µT
g+1 +
+∞∑
s=T g+2
δs−T
g 1
12
µs ≥ 25
256
µT
g ⇔
8(µδ)2 + 83µδ − 27 ≥ 0 ⇔ µδ ≥
√
7753− 83
16
≈ 0.316. 
Proof of Proposition 8
(i) We start by studying collusion sustainability in period Tg + 1. If the agreement
was respected, each incumbent would produce 17
96
µTg+1 and the entrant would produce
7
48
µTg+1. Therefore, if an incumbent deviates, its outupt and profit are:
qd3Tg+1 =
65
192
µTg+1 and Πd3Tg+1 =
4225
36864
µTg+1.
Therefore, each incumbent does not deviate in period Tg + 1 if and only if:
17
192
µTg+1 +
+∞∑
s=Tg+2
δs−Tg−1
1
12
µs ≥ 4225
36864
µTg+1 ⇔ µδ ≥ 961
4033
≈ 0.238.
(ii) Now, we analyze the incentives for incumbents to collude in period Tg. According to
the agreement, each incumbent should produce 3
16
µTg , while the entrant should produce
1
8
µTg . Therefore, the output and the profit of a deviating incumbent is:
qd3Tg =
11
32
µTg and Πd3Tg+1 =
121
1024
µTg .
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As a result, each incumbent complies with the collusive agreement iff:
3
32
µTg + δ
17
192
µTg+1 +
+∞∑
s=Tg+2
δs−Tg
1
12
µs ≥ 121
1024
µTg ⇔
− 16(µδ)2 + 247µδ − 75 ≥ 0.
The last inequality is satisfied if:
µδ ≥ 347−
√
115609
32
≈ 0.218. 
Proof of Proposition 9
Manipulating condition (11), we obtain:
− 1
64
+
3
32
(µδ) +
17
192
(µδ)2 +
1
12
(µδ)3
1− µδ ≥ 0 ⇔
− 1
64
+
7
64
µδ − 1
192
(µδ)2 − 1
192
(µδ)3 ≥ 0,
which holds for µδ ≥ 0.144 (approximately). 
Proof of Proposition 10
In the scenario of discontinuance of collusion, the sum of the incumbents’ profits with
the consumer surplus is:
T c−1∑
t=0
1
4
(µδ)t +
+∞∑
t=T c
1
8
(µδ)t +
1
2
T c−1∑
t=0
1
4
(µδ)t +
1
2
+∞∑
t=T c
9
16
(µδ)t =
12 + (µδ)T
c
32(1− µδ) .
Under predation, it is lower:
+∞∑
t=0
1
4
(µδ)t +
1
2
+∞∑
t=0
1
4
(µδ)t =
12
32(1− µδ) .
This concludes the proof, since the entrant’s surplus is surely positive (otherwise, it
would not enter the market). 
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